Abstract-Location privacy is an ever increasing concern as the pervasiveness of computing becomes more ubiquitous. This is especially apparent at the intersection of privacy, convenience, and quality of service in cellular networks. In this paper, we show the long term evolution (LTE) signaling plane to be vulnerable to location-based attacks via the timing advance (TA) parameter. To this end, we adapt the Cramér-Rao lower bound for timing advance-based estimation and show the associated estimator to be efficient. The analysis is complemented with numerical studies that feature synthetic and real-world data collected in existing LTE network deployments. Additionally, the Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement algorithm, a method of TA-based attack augmentation is examined. We show how it can simultaneously improve location resolution and negate the effects of poor network infrastructure geometry. The analysis and simulation demonstrate that a localization attack can yield resolution as high as 40 m.
On Location Privacy in LTE Networks I. INTRODUCTION P RIVACY is a historically polarizing subject. On one hand, it is an internationally recognized fundamental human right [1] . On the other hand, there is a movement that does not recognize this right or at a minimum advocates for something less than absolute privacy [2] [3] [4] . At the very least, this binary climate offers the observation that as technology becomes more ubiquitous, privacy becomes more obscure in implementation and less axiomatic. Privacy can be subdivided in many different ways. However, in this work we focus specifically on location privacy, which Beresford and Stajano define as [5] "…the ability to prevent other parties from learning one's current or past location." Indeed, it may be that the benefit of convenience outweighs public concerns of location privacy or that many are not even aware of this niche privacy sub-genre. Several studies have noted a lack of awareness or indifference toward location-based privacy [6] [7] [8] [9] .
Making location privacy an especially difficult subject to understand is that it is nuanced in implementation. Primarily of note is that location privacy and the accuracy of the position estimate are inextricably linked [10] . They are at least inversely proportional in the sense that as the accuracy of location information on an individual increases that person's privacy decreases by at least the same amount. No where is this more apparent than in cellular networks. With more individuals than ever joining the ever-expanding Long Term Evolution (LTE) network [11] the protocol bears a significant level of responsibility in protecting its users' privacy. While the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has made steps to improve older standards, such as the Universal Telecommunications System, in order to better protect users' privacy [12] the evolution of the protocol has opened new vulnerabilities specifically in the area of location privacy.
The main contribution of this work is to show the LTE signaling plane to be vulnerable to location-based attack through statistically rigorous analysis. Specifically, we will use the timing advance (TA), an LTE signaling plane parameter, as a mechanism for exploitation. Additionally, we highlight architectural shifts from previous cellular protocols that make LTE vulnerable to this type of attack and outline how with minimal equipment and expertise a location-based attack could be made even more potent. The analysis is complemented with numerical studies that feature synthetic and real-world data collected in existing LTE networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related work is discussed and contrasted with this investigation. In Section III, the TA is formally introduced and presented in context of the LTE network protocol. Due to the extensive use of acronyms throughout this work we also include Table I in this section to help guide the reader. In Section IV, the theory of quantization of a random variable (RV) is reviewed before it is applied specifically to the TA in Section V. Also in this section, a lower bound and maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE) for the position estimate are derived. Next, a method of position estimate augmentation, Cellular Synchronzation Assisted Refinement (CeSAR), is reviewed in Section VI. The results of numerical studies which compliment the previous analysis are then presented in Section VII and strategies for mitigating the location-based vulnerability in LTE are suggested in Section VIII. Finally, we make our concluding remarks in Section IX.
II. PRIOR ART
Previous work relevant to the present subject fall into two categories: parameter estimation of quantized random data and TA-based positioning.
In the former category, significant efforts have been made to establish a stochastic theory of quantization [13] [14] [15] [16] .
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright. Sheppard's correction [17] is an oft-cited, albeit sometimes misunderstood, calculation that has been invoked to justify the contribution of quantization to the latent variable's moments. As pointed out in [18] and explored in this paper, quantization can also lower data variance. Additionally, efforts in the application of this theory have been applied largely to amplitude quantization of signals [19] [20] [21] [22] .
A logical application of quantization estimation theory will also necessarily include a discussion of a lower bound for such estimation [20] , [21] , [23] . These forays usually include an exact result that is fairly cumbersome to calculate [23] . In the present work we build on these results to establish an intuitive approach to relating a well-known lower bound for continuoustime signals to quantized data. We also extend work done on quantization in amplitude to quantization in distance.
Similarly, TA-based positioning is well-traveled in the literature. These investigations began with the advent of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), which famously used the TA parameter [24] , [25] . However, timing synchronization was not as strict in GSM, and an estimated TA accuracy of 550 to 2,200 meters [25] likely dissuaded many from pursuing the topic further. Tentative steps were taken to try to average multiple TA measurements to improve accuracy [26] or to use the parameter for other applications such as traffic state estimation [27] , but it never achieved much traction.
It was not until the birth of LTE, which promised tighter timing requirements (resulting in better spatial resolution) that the TA as a location mechanism was reopened in the literature. Indeed is it suggested as a parameter for use in the LTE Positioning Protocol (LPP) [28] and has been invoked with some success in applications such as assisting in positioning [29] and proximity discovery in device to device implementations [30] . However, the use of real-world data is noticeably absent from the literature, as is any effort to validate simulation models against actual network deployments. To our knowledge, Hiltunen et al. [31] are the only researchers who have published results from LTE real-world data. However, they made no effort to characterize the data, instead opting to use it, similar to its function in LPP, as an additional dimension in a radio fingerprint database.
The idea of TA-based positioning refinement was first introduced in [32] . This idea of refinement was later applied to field measurements in [33] and [34] . We build on this body of work by presenting an updated analysis. The analysis provides a robust justification for a lower bound on the expected accuracy of the method. Further, numerical studies are used to highlight how the refinement method has a secondary benefit of negating effects of poor enhanced Node B (eNB) geometry. Finally, we introduce field data associated with the refinement method previously synthesized in simulation.
Adding to the significant body of literature on TA-based positioning we show how, in LTE, the TA is particularly vulnerable to attack. We further demonstrate its vulnerability with real-world data collected from existing LTE network deployments.
III. MORPHOLOGY OF THE LTE TIMING ADVANCE PARAMETER In this section we present a review of the LTE standard with the aim of presenting the structure and relationship of the TA to the protocol at large. Its operation in current (legacy) network deployments and future (heterogeneous) deployments are discussed.
A. The Timing Advance in Legacy Networks
The TA is a signaling plane parameter with the purpose of reconciling user equipment (UE) mobility with quality of service. LTE uses an orthogonal-frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) scheme which requires transmissions to be highly disciplined in time and frequency in order to avoid intersymbol interference with other UEs sharing service to the same eNB [35] . As UEs move throughout a serving cell their distance to the serving eNB may change thus changing the propagation delay between the UE and the eNB. The eNB constantly estimates the eNB distance and issues frequent TA updates in order to ensure the UE is continuously synchronized by compensating for the propagation delay.
The TA takes two main forms in normal operation. The first occurs when a user initially negotiates access to a eNB. During negotiation the UE will receive from the eNB a random access response (RAR) message which will contain several key pieces of information among which is the TA. In this form, the TA is an 11-bit quantity T A ∈ [0, . . . , 1282] [36] . The second form of the TA is used for maintenance of an existing connection. This value is relative and makes adjustments based on the current state of the TA. This version of the TA is found in a medium access control (MAC) layer control element (CE) and is a six-bit quantity T A ∈ [0, . . . , 63] [36] .
Whether issued during initial access or as a maintenance command, the TA is a discrete quantity thus limiting its resolution in time. Specifically, each TA unit advises the UE to advance or retard its transmissions by 16 × T A × T s seconds, where T s is the sampling period given by T s = (15, 000 × 2048) −1 . The calculation of T s is a function of the subcarrier spacing (15 kHz) and the Fast Fourier transform size (2048) [37] , [38] . Because the T A directly corresponds to the propagation delay between the UE and the eNB this value can be easily exploited to estimate the UE distance to the eNB,d, via a combination of already introduced relationships viz.
where c is the speed of light and the extra factor of 1/2 is included to take into account round-trip time. By setting T A = 1 it can be verified from (1) that the TA resolution in distance is 78.125 meters [39] . The frequency with which this value is updated is lower bounded by a parameter called the timeAlignmentTimer which is configurable by the individual network operator. Possible values of this timer include {500, 750, 1280, 1920, 2560, 5120, 10249, ∞} [40] . These values each represent the maximum number of subframes that can pass without receiving a TA. Because the subframe time is 1 ms in LTE, these values can be seen as the maximum number of milliseconds that can pass before a TA must be reissued, even if there is no change in the TA value [37] . Assuming the network chooses only finite values, at worst it can be assumed that a TA will be issued at least once every 10 seconds. At best the network will issue at least two TAs every second. It should also be noted that this is only a lower bound. In field measurements we have observed much higher frequencies of TA issuance. Also, because the purpose of the TA is to maintain time alignment it can be expected that a highly mobile UE will receive more TAs than one that is stationary.
Finally, we note that the TA is passed as a message in the MAC sublayer which sits below the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) sublayer [35] . Because the PDCP sublayer is solely responsible for encryption, the TA is sent in the clear [41] . This is a significant shift in security architecture from GSM in which these parameters would be sent encrypted [42] .
B. The Timing Advance in Heterogeneous Networks
Each MAC CE has two bits reserved for future use. In LTE release 10+ those bits are utilized as identifiers of a timing advance group (TAG). The purpose of this TAG is to enhance throughput by allowing the UE to connect to multiple serving eNBs simultaneously that may not be physically collocated (in release 11+) [40] . The size of this field indicates that a maximum number of four TAGs is envisioned.
As we have already seen, the TA parameter can be used to estimate the UE location from a given eNB. If information were to be provided from multiple eNBs a TA-based location attack would be able to utilize an unprecedented level of information, essentially reducing the location problem to one of standard multilateration.
C. Software Address Space in LTE Networks
Similar to the internet protocol, LTE assigns temporary identification to users within a given serving cell. This address or ID is a sixteen bit value called the cell-radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) [35] . All transmissions, including TA issuance, from an eNB (after initial access negotiation) will carry the C-RNTI of the desired recipient. Therefore, one difficulty which an attacker would need to overcome is mapping a specific UE to its assigned C-RNTI. In this light, the C-RNTI can be seen as an attempt at data obfuscation. However, the quality of the obfuscation provided by the C-RNTI has been brought into question by other work [12] , [43] . Because this portion of the attack has been previously investigated we assume the attacker has access to this mapping and focus instead specifically on the TA.
IV. QUANTIZATION OF A RANDOM VARIABLE
In this section we develop the theoretical framework for subsequent analysis of the information leakage afforded by the TA parameter. Specifically, we review the theory associated with quantization of a RV.
A. The Probability Density of a Quantized Random Variable
Quantization is sometimes regarded as a non-linear operation making analysis of such non-injective operations difficult. Here we review the work presented in [13] and highlight that quantization can be shown to be a linear operation in the RV signal space.
First, consider an latent RV N with a continuous density and support V ∈ [a, b] where a and b may not necessarily be finite. Next, consider a quantization function Q such that Q : N → N and the density of N is defined as
Here we make use of δ(·) to represent the Dirac delta function and α to represent some appropriate scaling parameter. The relation in (2) can be regarded as a quantized version of N with quantization bins evenly spaced by τ . It is well-known that the quantization operation contributes to the overall noise of the resulting signal. This is represented by the convolution p N (x) with a uniform distribution p U (x) with support ∈ [−τ/2, τ/2]. As a first step in defining Q, consider the result of this convolution
where
shifted by some amount d and α is a constant which ensures the Law of Total Probability applies to the result of the convolution. The second and final step taken in defining Q is a multiplication of (3) with an impulsion train (Dirac comb), τ (x), with periodicity τ . It is easily verified that (2) is the resulting product. This process is presented graphically in Figure 1 . To see the equivalency of Q to quantization, consider (3) as the difference of two scaled cumulative distribution functions (c.f., Figure 1 ). The product of that density with a Dirac delta results in which is exactly the quantization operation, a direct result of the definition of a cumulative distribution function.
Note that all steps taken in Q are linear and thus also commute. Therefore, while the operation is indeed non-linear in the observations (i.e., the result of a quantized observation cannot be undone), the operation is linear in signal space. This will be the subject of further discussion in a subsequent section.
B. The Characteristic Function of a Quantized Random Variable
Consider p N (x) f ←→ PN (φ) which are related via the Fourier transform and PN (φ) is the characteristic function (CF) of p N (x). Here the quantization function is defined asQ :N →N with the Fourier equivalent steps that defined the mapping of the probability densities, 1 
Here A(φ) is the result of the product of CFs P N (φ) and P U (φ). Similar to Q,Q is completely defined by linear operations.
C. The Effect of Quantization Bin Size
To illuminate the effect of τ on (2) and (5), first consider the case when τ → 0. The effect on p N (x) is to reduce the separation between impulses proportional to τ . Notice also that the coefficients a n are also functions of τ since a smaller quantization bin will result in less realizations of that RV binned to that location. Thus, as τ → 0, a n → 0 so that
The effect is opposite in the Fourier space due primarily to
. Thus, as τ → 0, the separation of A n−1 and A n increases proportionally such that
Now consider the case when τ → ∞ for (2) and (5). When the bounds a and b are finite it can be seen that
since as τ → ∞, a 0 → 1 and a n → 0, ∀n = 0. This relationship can be extended to any probability density regardless of whether or not the bounds are finite by again invoking the Law of Total Probability. Similarly, let τ → ∞ for P N (φ). This time the separation between A n−1 and A n will go to 0 which follows from the limit of 1/τ as τ → ∞. Because P N (φ) is the sum over all n, we find
which can be verified to be the Fourier transform pair of (8) .
D. The Variance of a Quantized Normal Random Variable
With the behavior of a general quantized RV established, we now define
as a normal RV with zero mean and some variance σ to simplify the discussion of quantization on variance (c.f., Figure 1 ). Next, we use the CF defined in (5) and the definition in (10) to motivate the discussion via the fact that
Note that because (10) is zero mean then the case where k = 2 is equivalent to the variance. Rather than derive a closed form solution for (11) consider first the case when τ = 0 such that (7) applies. Using (11) it is easy to verify that E{η 2 } = σ 2 . Now let τ = where is some nonnegative arbitrarily small number. Since is small we only need consider
in order to estimate the resulting variance with high fidelity since the term 1/τ in (5) will be arbitrarily large. Stated another way, we only need to consider a single function A(φ) from (5), not the entire sum. Using the product rule, the derivative can be evaluated as
Notice that when evaluated at φ = 0 the first and second derivatives of P N (φ) are 0 and −σ 2 respectively. Also, note that P U (0) = P N (0) = 1. After applying these observations and distributing the negative sign we can simplify (13) to
Since P U (φ) is concave down ∀τ > 0 at φ = 0 we have that
where the inequality is strict for a sufficiently small and nonnegative . 1 Next, consider the case when τ = ∞. Recall from (7) that P N (φ) = 1. It can be verified that the second derivative is 0 for φ = 0. Thus, when τ is very large the variance of N becomes very small such that the inequality in (15) For convenience define
where f (·) is a function which is periodic in d with period τ . The amplitude of f (·) is β and has offset C. It will subsequently be useful to determine the τ for which E{η 2 } < C − β/2 (i.e., the value at which the variance of the quantized RV is guaranteed to be larger than the latent RV ∀d). To find this range let d = 0, which we have previously seen, is a minima of (12) . To make calculations more tractable we only consider n ∈ {−1, 0, 1} in (2) . Because this function is even, the value of a −1 = a 1 = (−τ/2). The desired bound on 1 The value of the second term in (14) can be calculated to a high degree of accuracy using Sheppard's corrections [17] when τ ≤ σ [13] . the variance of this probability mass is then straightforward to compute as
where equality holds when τ ≈ 3.4σ . Thus, we state that τ 3.4σ is a necessary and sufficient condition such that the inequality in (15) First, note that as τ increases the amplitude β also increases. As previously calculated, (16) always stays above σ 2 N for τ 3.4σ . As τ increases beyond this bound then the minimum value of the variance may drop below σ 2 N for certain d. Second, note that for sufficiently small τ (e.g., τ < σ N the observed variance of η is very close to the the corrected value of the variance of η which agrees with Sheppards famous corrections [17] . However, as τ grows above σ N , the correction becomes less accurate. Although not shown in the figure, for larger τ the minimum of (16) will eventually reach zero and the maximum will grow to infinity.
E. Information Loss in a Quantized Random Variable
Here, following [13] , we invoke the analogy of traditional sampling theory and the Nyquist rate in order to investigate injectivity in N → Q(N ). Recall that when sampling a signal the sampled representation is considered representative of the original continuous-time signal if and only if the sampling rate is greater than or equal to twice the highest frequency in the continuous-time signal. If this condition is met we may say that the sampling operation is injective. Stated another way, if the former condition is met, we may perfectly recover the continuous-time signal from the sampled representation because the sampled representation contains all of the information of the original signal.
Notice the similarity between sampling and quantization. The connection is illustrated by the second step in defining Q which involved multiplication of an impulsion train with the convolved latent density. If our goal is to recover the latent density then the conditions necessary and sufficient for said recovery is of interest. Widrow's First Quantization Theorem (QT1) states that if a RV is bandlimited 2 by ±π/τ then the probabiliy density and CF of the latent RV can be perfectly recovered [44] . The implications of this theorem are far reaching; however, many real-world RVs are not bandlimited. For instance, the normal RV is an example of an extremely common RV with infinite support. Thankfully, Widrow also noticed this difficulty and showed in his Second Quantization Theorem (QT2) that an approximately bandlimited RV (relative to the quantization bin size τ ) can also be recovered with high fidelity [44] . The recovery of moments is closely related to Sheppard's correction, which is shown here for the second moment [17] 
Widrow offers τ ≤ σ as a rule of thumb to define approximately bandlimited [13] . The efficacy of this rule of thumb is verified by inspection of Figure 2 .
F. A Lower Bound for the Variance of a Quantized Random Variable
The Cramér-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) is a well-known bound for the minimum variance of a parameter, θ , estimate [45] . The bound is defined by
where T is an unbiased estimator of θ and I(θ ) is the Fisher information with respect to θ . Next, we show the CRLB to hold for quantized data under certain conditions.
Theorem 1: If a latent RV parameterized by θ satisfies either QT1 or QT2, then
Var θ {T } ≥ CRLB θ , τ ∈ [0, 3.4σ ], and ∀d (20) where T is an unbiased estimator of θ which uses quantized observations of the RV to estimate θ . To show this bound consider a normal RV, N(0, σ ), which is quantized with interval τ = σ and d = 0. If we let τ → 0 then the relationship (7) applies and the proposition becomes the standard CRLB.
Alternatively, as τ increases from zero (2) can also be seen as a sum of shifted and scaled Bernoulli pseudo-densities. We note that each of the sub-densities is not a true probability density since the resulting sum must satisfy the Law of Total Probability.
Next, recall that the Fisher information of a Bernoulli RV is given by I( p) = σ where σ 2 b is the variance of a Bernoulli RV. Therefore, the Fisher information of the quantized RV is given by 2 Widrow uses the term "bandlimited" to define the case when a CF has a limited support [13] . We adopt this terminology for the remainder of our exposition. 
whereσ 2
n is the pseudo-variance of the nth Bernoulli pseudo-distribution. Now we have already shown, and Sheppard's correction for the second moment (18) verifies (c.f., also Figure 2) , that for small τ the variance of the quantized signal must be larger than that of the latent signal. Therefore, the Fisher information of the observed RV will be smaller than the Fisher information of the latent RV and the inequality in the theorem will be strict. Similarly, we have shown that the variance of the observed RV will be greater than the original for τ 3.4σ so the proposed bound will hold for τ ∈ [0, ∼ 3.4σ ], ∀d.
To verify the theorem is valid consider a normal RV N (μ, σ 2 ) where the parameter to be estimated is the mean, μ. We show the results of a numerical study in Figure 3 in which we estimate μ via the standard maximum-likelihood method for various quantile sizes, τ . It can be seen that for any shift in the quantization bins (∀d) that the resulting root mean square error (RMSE) lies above the CRLB for τ 3.4σ which verifies the theorem. Conversely, for values of τ 3.4σ the results shown in Figure 3 demonstrate that there is no bound appropriate ∀d.
V. THE TIMING ADVANCE PARAMETER AS A QUANTIZATIZED RANDOM VARIABLE
In this section we describe the TA as a quantized RV and derive a MLE for the position estimate of the UE made using TA measurements.
A. Spatial Quantization in LTE Networks
It is not difficult to see that the TA is a quanitzed RV. First, the eNB must make a distance estimate based on the time of arrival of a UE's uplink frame which we model as a normal RV [48] , [49] . Next, the eNB must determine if the measured distance necessitates adjustment to the UE's timing. Because the eNB can only affect timing adjustment in binary form, the timing mismatch must be greater than 78.125 meters in order for an adjustment to be issued. Hence, the TA can be seen to be quantizing the UE's distance from the serving eNB.
B. A Maximum-Likelihood Estimate and Lower Bound for Timing Advance Positioning
In order to derive an MLE for a UE position we must first characterize the distribution of error after quantization p(ξ ) which is shown in Figure 1 and given in (2). However, we have shown in (2) that the shape of the density is parameterized by d. Despite this fact, we will further show that it is also appropriate to model all possible p(ξ |d) with a single density.
To begin, let p(ξ, d) be the joint density of the error in the distance estimate ξ and annular offset d. Next, let p(ξ ) ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) be a marginal density of p (ξ, d) . This choice of a distribution models the continuous error associated with distance measurement and is widely accepted in the literature [48] , [49] . To arrive at p(ξ |d), contrast the effect on τ (η − d) of when a UE is positioned in the center of a TA annulus (d = 0) with when a UE is on a TA boundary (d = τ/2). Because p(ξ |d) = p N (η), it appears that p(ξ ) and p(d) should be dependent since the shape of p(ξ |d) is completely dependent on d. However, it has been shown that if the conditions of QT1 or QT2 are satisfied then p(ξ ) and p(d) are, in fact, independent [46] , [47] .
The implications of this paradoxical independence on the TA as a RV is that regardless of where the UE is located within a TA annulus (i.e., annular offset), the error can be modeled with the same density assuming the conditions of QT1 or QT2 can be met. This is an important fact to establish in order to make the MLE tractable. Field measurements have shown that the latent standard deviation in distance measurement is ∼50 m [33] . It has also been shown previously that the TA quantization bin size is 78.125 m wide. Therefore, for LTE TA-based positioning τ ≈ 1.5σ , which we propose is sufficiently close to satisfy the conditions of QT2 and well within the acceptable range for the Theorem 1 to apply. Contrast this with the GSM quantile size of 550 m. Assuming the latent GSM measurement error is the same as in LTE, τ ≈ 5.5σ and neither Theorem 1 or QT2 apply. Thus, LTE marks a significant statistical shift in what we are able to do with the TA parameter.
The shape of the the joint density is presented in the top panel of Figure 4 when the latent density is normal. When the joint density is rotated such that the d dimension is not visible, as in the bottom panel, one can observe the latent density. If the value of d is completely unknown it would be reasonably modeled as a uniform RV. Thus, by integrating
For an MLE to TA-based positioning we can now formulate the problem for a set of distance measurements 
Solving (23) and (24) directly involves an exhaustive search in p. However, numerical solutions have been proposed that have been shown to be statistically efficient (e.g., [50] ). Theorem 1 then states that the mean squared error (MSE) in the position estimate is bounded by
is the Fisher information matrix given by [48] I {i,
and the bracketed subscripts indicate the matrix index. For the case of multilateration-based position estimation and normal density, this expectation is well-known and given by [48] 
Thus, in this section we have proposed a lower bound under the condition that τ 3.4σ and a corresponding MLE.
VI. CELLULAR SYNCHRONIZATION ASSISTED REFINEMENT
A previously introduced algorithm, Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement (CeSAR), has been proposed to increase the accuracy of TA-based positioning [32] . This method requires a sensor in the serving cell of the UE to be located. The CeSAR procedure, outlined in Algorithm 1, further requires that the position of the sensor and the serving eNB be known a priori as well as the UE C-RNTI. 3 The essence of the procedure is that the TA contains two pieces of information: the distance of the UE to the serving eNB and the UE's uplink transmit time. If a local sensor knows the UE's uplink transmit time, t, and can record the time when the UE observes the transmission, t , then the distance from the sensor to the UE can be determined. This effectively adds another dimension to the system of equations defined byd.
Besides improving positioning accuracy, CeSAR has several strengths:
1) It can be performed completely passively. Therefore, during a location attack the sensor cannot be detected from electromagnetic emanations. 2) Strategic positioning of the sensor can overcome geometric dilution of precision [48] in eNBs arranged disadvantageously. This is a strength that will be shown in Section VII to be able to dramatically improve accuracy. 3) The sensor need not be complex. The advent of software defined radio (SDR) has put this type of attack within reach of reasonably skilled actors. Further, SDR technology has significantly lowered the monetary cost of entry to this type of exploitation. Referring now to Algorithm 1, we give a detailed account of the procedure. First, the sensor listens for the primary and secondary search signals from a serving eNB (2) (3) (4) . This is a necessary step for synchronizing itself to the base station thus giving it the ability to decode cell data. Next, the sensor decodes packets that it receives until it finds the target C-RNTI (5-8). Once a downlink frame being sent to the target UE has been identified (8), the associated TA is striped from the MAC CE and converted to a distance (9) . If there is more than one serving eNB (N > 1) this process can be repeated. Simultaneously, the TA is used to estimate the target UE's uplink transmission time (10) . With this information, the sensor can measure the propagation delay from the UE to the 3 Methods for mapping the C-RNTI to a UE are detailed in [32] . x ←observed C-RNTI 7:
x == target C-RNTI 9:d i ← TA×78.125 m 10: t ← est_Tx_Time(TA) 11: t ← observed uplink burst time 12 : 16: end procedure sensor and convert that to a distance measurement (11) (12) (13) . This additional distance measurement is added to the distance measurements obtained from the N serving eNBs and used to find a MLE via previously discussed means (14) (15) .
VII. RESULTS
In this section we present numerical studies done with synthetic and real-world data collected in actual LTE network deployments. This section will show that the proposed MLE agrees with the lower bound derived in Section IV and provide expected accuracies for TA-based location attacks.
A. Method of Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
As was mentioned in Section IV, the exact MLE associated with this type of positioning is not available in closed form and requires an exhaustive search to solve exactly [48] . Despite this, approximate solutions to (23) and (24) that have been shown to be efficient have been proposed (e.g., [50] , [51] ).
In this work we solve (23) and (24) by iterative numerical search techniques. First, the entire serving area is searched to maximize (22) at some course granularity. Second, the numerical search area is moved to the coarse estimate and the granularity is reduced to approximately 2.5 meters. The refined area is again searched for a local maximum in order to produce a refined estimate.
We acknowledge the computational burden imposed by this method of numerical estimation, but adopt it in order to divorce the results from idiosyncrasies associated with other existing approximate methods. In this way, we believe the results are displayed in a form most appropriate for interpretation in the context of the preceding analysis. We also note that more computationally pragmatic methods could easily be adapted to this localization attack.
Since the data required to formulate (22) is readily available to a properly equipped eavesdropper, we note that the computational cost of the attack is completely decided by the method of solving (22) , which may be nontrivial. 4 Besides the proposed method, some available options include a gradient descent algorithm [48] , linearization of the objective [52] , and the iterative approach used in [51] . While these methods have been shown to work well in practice, they are not guaranteed to find the global solution to (22) and may not be statistically efficient. The local optimization problem is further exacerbated when there is no prior knowledge of the UE location since the success of some of the aforementioned algorithms is dependent on proper initialization.
The computational cost of the proposed scheme is dependent on the required granularity and the sizes of the initial and refined tracking area. Because it performs an exhaustive search . We note that the proposed method is not exact, but approximate to the granularity specified by the refined tracking area.
B. Empirical and Synthetic Studies
The experimental setup for subsequent numerical studies is presented in Figure 5 . The UE victim is placed at the origin and three serving eNBs are considered in order to simulate future heterogeneous network deployments. Because the CRLB is solely a function of angles to the target and not distance (c.f., (27) ) the serving eNBs are all placed at some arbitrary distance, r , from the UE. The eNBs share an angular separation of θ ∈ {π/4, π/5, 3π/20, π/10}. Because in an actual LTE network deployment the number of serving eNBs and σ N do not vary significantly, we show positioning accuracy relative to infrastructure geometry by iterating the geometry through the various values of θ . In line with field measurements [33] , the observed σ ≈ 50 meters for all serving eNBs. Also, following (1), the latent data is quantized by τ = 78.125 m before producing a distance estimate.
Initially, we do not consider a CeSAR augmented attack. However, later the CeSAR procedure is used to amplify the attack to show the theoretical benefit. For these simulations, the CeSAR sensor is placed on the same circle of arbitrary distance as the eNBs, but with a fixed angular separation from the abscissa of θ = 3π/4. In this way, we demonstrate how Fig. 6 . The results of the numerical studies in terms of RMSE are presented in this figure. Simulated and real-world error data are presented for the geometries presented in Figure 5 alongside the lower bound presented in Section IV. strategic placement of the sensor can negate the geometric effects of poor geometry in the existing network infrastructure. For simulated sensor data the unobserved σ = 10 meters and the resulting estimate is quantized by 12 meters in line with a sample rate of 25 MSps.
This simulated data is also compared with acutal TA data collected in an actual LTE network deployment in downtown Baltimore, Maryland [33] . This error data is superimposed on the simulated eNB locations in order to compare actual realizations of TA error with the assumptions made in simulation. In real-world implementation each eNB will have some specific bias which results in the error distribution being nonzero. We assume that this bias is measured and known a priori such that the position estimatep is unbiased. For the CeSAR sensor, actual error data is generated through a radio ranging experiment done in SDR. In this experiment a receiver estimates a transmitter's distance by measuring the time of flight of a 1023 bit pseudo-random binary phase shift keyed sequence with a sample rate of 20 MSps. The estimate is made by means of a matched filter. Like the TA error data, this data is superimposed on the simulated CeSAR sensor location.
The results of these studies, with and without CeSAR augmentation, are presented in Figure 6 alongside the theoretical lower bound derived in Section IV for each scenario. First, we observe close agreement with the results and the theoretical lower bound further validating the analysis. Second, we see close agreement between the simulated data and real-world data. This agreement validates assumptions we have made regarding the nature of the data in general.
Next, we note the trend of localization accuracy. When θ is small and CeSAR is not used to augment the position estimate the RMSE is relatively high. As θ increases to its maximum value, the RMSE goes down. This agrees with the trend predicted by (27) . Thus, the existing network geometry is seen as a strong influence on the performance of the attack. In this study the accuracy varies on the order of 50 meters depending on the infrastructure layout. However, when the CeSAR sensor is included and strategically placed, the dependence of the attack on network geometry can be essentially negated thus illustrating one of the main strengths of CeSAR mentioned in Section VI.
Finally, we demonstrate with real and synthetic data that accuracies on the order of 40 meters are possible. This simultaneously highlights the vulnerability of the LTE signaling plane and the power of this type of attack and the method of CeSAR augmentation.
VIII. VULNERABILITY MITIGATION
Here, we suggest three ways of mitigating the location privacy vulnerability presented in this paper.
Most obviously, the vulnerability could be mitigated by encrypting the TA parameter. In this way, the TA would not be available to a third party while still retaining uplink timing control at the eNB. Without the TA, a would-be attacker would not be able to identify an eNB-UE distance, nor would they be privy to the target UE's uplink scheduling. Therefore, neither traditional TA-based location attacks nor the CeSAR augmented attack would be possible.
A second method of vulnerability mitigation would be to encrypt uplink resource scheduling. If this means of mitigation is used, an attacker would not be able to augment a location-based attack with the CeSAR method. However, the attacker would still have the information necessary to execute a traditional TA-based attack. Thus, their precision would be reduced (c.f., Figure 3 ), but the target UE position could still be estimated. While encrypting the TA completely mitigates timing-based location attacks, additionally encrypting the uplink resource scheduling provides a defense-in-depth appropriate for securing user location privacy.
Because the TA and uplink resource grant scheduling is currently done in the clear presumably to reduce UE computational burden and prioritize data throughput, it should be noted that shifting to an architecture which requires more encrypted data could degrade user quality of service. We therefore offer an alternative which requires no encryption: timing and scheduling semi-persistence. Currently, resource scheduling and timing management is highly dynamic and done on a frame-by-frame basis [35] in order to exploit the time-varying nature of an individual user channel. However, by reducing the rate at which these parameters are updated, the protocol makes this sensitive signaling less available to a third party. The level of persistence would need to be commensurate with user mobility. In other words, a stationary user should receive less resource scheduling 5 and timing updates than a mobile user. While this option would not completely protect a user from a location attack (especially highly mobile users), it would strike a balance between data throughput and privacy protection.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that the LTE signaling plane is vulnerable to exploitation of the TA parameter. This vulnerability is enabled by the architectural evolution from earlier protocols, such as GSM, which leave the signaling plane open to observation. 5 Semi-persistent scheduling is already offered by the current LTE standard [35] .
To quantify said vulnerability we have derived a lower bound and corresponding MLE which can be used to benchmark the accuracy afforded by TA-based positioning. This bound has been verified through numerical studies utilizing both synthetic and real-world data. A corollary is that popular conceptions of the nature of TA data has been verified through the preceding analysis and studies.
We further investigated the possibility of augmenting a TA-based attack with the CeSAR method and showed that it can simultaneously improve positioning accuracy and sedate the effects of poor network infrastructure geometry. The confluence of its passive nature with more ready access to SDR technology make it a particularly potent threat. In our studies we presented average accuracies as tight as 40 meters as possible.
Finally, we have proposed suggestions for mitigating the aforementioned vulnerability to location privacy.
